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 Twelve years have passed since we first took up 
challenges to the broadcast ownership rules and diversity 
initiatives of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” 
or “Commission”). In some respects the Commission has made 
progress in the intervening years. In key areas, however, it has 
fallen short. These shortcomings are at the center of this 
dispute—the third (and likely not the last) round in a protracted 
battle over the future of the nation’s broadcast industry. 
Specifically, the parties present challenges to the Commission’s 
“eligible entity” definition, its Quadrennial Review process, and 
its rule on television joint sales agreements.  
 Although courts owe deference to agencies, we also 
recognize that, “[a]t some point, we must lean forward from the 
bench to let an agency know, in no uncertain terms, that enough 
is enough.” Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao, 314 
F.3d 143, 158 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis and internal quotation 
marks omitted). For the Commission’s stalled efforts to promote 
diversity in the broadcast industry, that time has come. We 
conclude that the FCC has unreasonably delayed action on its 
definition of an “eligible entity”—a term it has attempted to use 
as a lynchpin for initiatives to promote minority and female 




 Equally troubling is that nearly a decade has passed since 
the Commission last completed a review of its broadcast 
ownership rules. These rules lay the groundwork for how the 
broadcast industry operates and have major implications for 
television, radio, and newspaper organizations. Although federal 
law commands the Commission to conduct a review of its rules 
every four years, the 2006 cycle is the last one it has finished; 
the 2010 and 2014 reviews remain open. Several broadcast 
owners have petitioned us to wipe all the rules off the books in 
response to this delay—creating, in effect, complete 
deregulation in the industry. This is the administrative law 
equivalent of burning down the house to roast the pig, and we 
decline to order it. However, we note that this remedy, while 
extreme, might be justified in the future if the Commission does 
not act quickly to carry out its legislative mandate. 
 Whereas the first two issues before us involve agency 
delay, the third is a challenge to agency action. The Commission 
regulates the number of television stations a company can own. 
In 2014, it determined that parties were evading its ownership 
limits through the influence exerted by advertising contracts 
known as joint sales agreements. As a result, it created a rule 
designed to address this perceived problem. However, we 
conclude that the Commission improperly enacted the rule; 
hence we vacate it and remand the matter to the Commission.  
I. Background 
 This is the third volume in a long-running saga that has 
its roots in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). Section 202(h) of that law 
imposes on the Commission what was initially a biennial—and 
is now a quadrennial—obligation to examine its broadcast 
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ownership rules. Broadly speaking, the purpose of these rules is 
to limit consolidation in the industry by capping the amount of 
common control that is permissible. Section 202(h) provides that 
the Commission “shall” review its rules on broadcast ownership 
every four years, “shall determine whether any of such rules are 
necessary in the public interest as the result of competition,” and 
“shall repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no 
longer in the public interest.” Id. § 202(h), 110 Stat. at 111–12, 
as amended by Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99–100 
(2004) (making review quadrennial as opposed to biennial).  
 Our first foray into § 202(h) came in 2004 when we ruled 
on challenges to the Commission’s 2002 review of its ownership 
rules. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (“Prometheus I”). Though § 202(h) is limited to a 
review for whether ownership rules remain necessary in light of 
competition in the broadcast industry, Prometheus I also 
involved a challenge to the Commission’s efforts to promote 
minority and female broadcast ownership. 
 Following our decision in Prometheus I, the Commission 
set about fine-tuning its minority and female ownership 
initiatives at the same time that it conducted its 2006 
Quadrennial Review. In December 2007, it adopted two orders: 
the first completing the 2006 review and the second 
implementing diversity-related efforts. (Though adopted in late 
2007, they were released in early 2008.) The former has become 
known as the “2008 Order.” See 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory 
Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership 
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order and Order 
on Reconsideration, 23 F.C.C.R. 2010 (Dec. 18, 2007). 
Meanwhile, the latter is called the “Diversity Order.” See 
Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting 
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Services, 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the 
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules 
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, Report and Order and Third Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 5922 (Dec. 18, 2007). In 
2011, we decided challenges to both the 2008 Order and the 
Diversity Order. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 
F.3d 431 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Prometheus II”).  
  In Prometheus I and Prometheus II we reviewed 
challenges to completed § 202(h) review cycles. But, in the 
aftermath of Prometheus II, the process broke down. The 2010 
Quadrennial Review, which was underway at the time of 
Prometheus II, is still not complete. It was rolled into the 2014 
review cycle, which remains ongoing. With its Quadrennial 
Review process backed up and our remand instructions from 
Prometheus II unfulfilled, the Commission issued a combined 
order and notice of proposed rulemaking in 2014. See 2014 
Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s 
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant 
to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Further 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Report and Order, 29 
F.C.C.R. 4371 (Mar. 31, 2014) (“2014 FNPRM & Order”).  
 That brings us to the current dispute. In May 2014, 
Prometheus filed in our Court a petition for review of the 2014 
FNPRM & Order. Shortly afterward, Howard Stirk Holdings, 
LLC; the National Association of Broadcasters; and Nexstar 
Broadcasting, Inc. filed separate petitions for review in the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals. The FCC filed a notice of multi-circuit 
petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3), and the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation randomly selected the D.C. 
Circuit as the venue for the petitions. That Court consolidated 
them, and the petitioners and various intervenors fully briefed 
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the case. (Consistent with our past usage, we refer to petitioners 
and intervenors raising anti-deregulatory challenges as “Citizen 
Petitioners”1 and to groups seeking deregulation as 
“Deregulatory Petitioners.”2)   
 Citizen Petitioners argued that the D.C. Circuit should 
transfer the case to us because the petitions related, at least in 
part, to Prometheus II. Our decision there ended in a remand, 
and we retained jurisdiction over the remanded issues. 
Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 472. Deregulatory Petitioners 
opposed transfer, maintaining that most of the issues in front of 
the D.C. Circuit were independent of Prometheus II. By order 
dated November 24, 2015, that Court transferred the 
consolidated petitions to us, and we heard argument on April 19, 
2016.3   
                                              
1 Citizen Petitioners here are Prometheus Radio Project; Office 
of Communication, Inc., of the United Church of Christ; 
National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians–
Communications Workers of America; National Organization 
for Women Foundation; Media Alliance; Media Council 
Hawaii; Common Cause; Benton Foundation; and Multicultural 
Media, Telecom and Internet Council.   
 
2 Deregulatory Petitioners before us are Howard Stirk Holdings, 
LLC; National Association of Broadcasters; Nexstar 
Broadcasting, Inc.; and Mission Broadcasting, Inc.  
 
3 In the D.C. Circuit, Howard Stirk was the lead petitioner. We 
have re-captioned the case to make Prometheus the lead 
petitioner for consistency with our previous two decisions.  
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II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 These petitions present challenges to both agency delay 
(the eligible entity definition and the failure to complete the 
Quadrennial Review) and agency action (the joint sales 
agreement rule). These two categories have different 
jurisdictional hooks and standards of review.  
A. Delayed agency action 
 Because circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 
the FCC’s final rulemaking action, see infra Section B, we also 
have exclusive jurisdiction to review claims of agency inaction. 
See Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Union v. Occupational 
Safety & Health Admin., 145 F.3d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(citing Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 
F.2d 70, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). This serves a commonsense 
purpose: “Because the statutory obligation of a Court of Appeals 
to review on the merits may be defeated by an agency that fails 
to resolve disputes, a Circuit Court may resolve claims of 
unreasonable delay in order to protect its future jurisdiction.” 
Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr., 750 F.2d at 76.  
 Our standard of review comes from Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”) § 706(1), which allows us to “compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 
U.S.C. § 706(1). Under this provision, our “polestar is 
reasonableness.” Public Citizen Health Research Group, 314 
F.3d at 151. We must “balance the importance of the subject 
matter being regulated with the regulating agency’s need to 
discharge all of its statutory responsibilities under a reasonable 
timetable.” Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Union, 145 F.3d at 
123. We have held that,  
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[w]ith this balance in mind, unreasonable delay 
should be measured by the following factors: 
First, the court should ascertain the length of time 
that has elapsed since the agency came under a 
duty to act. Second, the reasonableness of the 
delay should be judged in the context of the 
statute authorizing the agency’s action. Third, the 
court should assess the consequences of the 
agency’s delay. Fourth, the court should consider 
any plea of administrative error, administrative 
inconvenience, practical difficulty in carrying out 
a legislative mandate, or need to prioritize in the 
face of limited resources. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We refer to these here as 
the Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Union factors.   
B. Final agency action 
 Circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over final FCC 
rulemaking under 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1). 
Per § 706(2) of the APA, we can set aside agency action that is 
arbitrary or capricious. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). “The scope of review 
under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a 
court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Despite this deference, we 
require the agency to “examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action[,] including a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 When the FCC conducts a Quadrennial Review under 
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§ 202(h), that provision also affects our standard of review, as it 
requires that “no matter what the Commission decides to do to 
any particular rule—retain, repeal, or modify (whether to make 
more or less stringent)—it must do so in the public interest and 
support its decision with a reasoned analysis.” Prometheus I, 
373 F.3d at 395. We have also concluded that, when § 202(h) 
refers to rules being “necessary,” that term means “useful,” 
“convenient,” or “helpful.” Id. at 394.  
III. The Eligible Entity Definition 
 The FCC, in line with its statutory obligation to promote 
minority and female broadcast ownership, has attempted to give 
preferences to certain “eligible entities.” Citizen Petitioners 
support the Commission’s objectives but argue that its definition 
of eligible entities has not been helpful to minority and female 
ownership. They contend that the Commission, in failing to 
adopt a better definition, has violated our instructions from 
Prometheus I and Prometheus II. They ask us to grant them 
relief under APA § 706(1) or through a writ of mandamus. For 
its part, the Commission says that it has tried to comply with our 
previous two remands but that it lacks the administrative record 
necessary to implement a different definition. However, this 
conclusion is tentative, and the Commission has yet to determine 
in a final order that it cannot do what Citizen Petitioners ask.4  
                                              
4 Citizen Petitioners, in addition to requesting APA § 706(1) and 
mandamus relief, also ask us to conclude that the Commission 
has acted arbitrarily and capriciously. However, because they 
contest agency delay rather than agency action, APA § 706(1) 
and mandamus are the only available options. See, e.g., Oil, 
Chemical & Atomic Workers Union, 145 F.3d at 123. 
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A. The FCC’s objectives 
 The Commission has a statutory obligation to promote 
minority and female broadcast ownership. For instance, 
Congress has provided, in the context of applications for 
licenses or construction permits, that a “significant preference 
shall be granted to any applicant controlled by a member or 
members of a minority group.” 47 U.S.C. § 309(i). And for 
licenses and permits that the Commission awards using 
competitive bidding, one of its objectives must be promoting 
opportunities for “businesses owned by members of minority 
groups and women.” Id. § 309(j).  
 As early as 1978, the FCC recognized that the inadequate 
representation of minorities in the broadcast industry was 
“detrimental not only to the minority audience but to all of the 
viewing and listening public.” Statement of Policy on Minority 
Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C. 2d 979, 980–81 
(May 25, 1978). Twelve years later, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. 
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), the Supreme Court upheld under 
intermediate scrutiny two types of racial preferences designed to 
remedy this problem. Id. at 566.5 Not long afterward, however, 
the Supreme Court reversed course and held that “all racial 
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local 
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court 
under strict scrutiny.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 
                                              
5 To pass intermediate scrutiny, preferences “must be 
substantially related to an important governmental objective.” 
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
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U.S. 200, 227 (1995).6 Adarand did not affect gender 
preferences, which received intermediate scrutiny prior to that 
decision and have continued in its aftermath to be subject to that 
standard. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 
U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60 
(2001). 
 Following Adarand, one of the Commission’s major 
initiatives for fulfilling its statutory obligation has been to give 
“eligible entities” certain preferences. This dates back to the 
2002 § 202(h) review cycle. The Commission had established 
new caps on radio station ownership but agreed to a 
“grandfathering” provision that would allow companies that 
already owned stations in excess of the limits to continue to do 
so, with the caveat that they were not allowed to transfer the 
grandfathered combinations. The FCC concluded during the 
2002 cycle that, notwithstanding the prohibition, licensees could 
transfer grandfathered combinations to eligible entities. See 
2014 FNPRM & Order ¶ 264 (summarizing background). At the 
time, the Commission said that an eligible entity was one that 
qualifies as a small business under the revenue-based definition 
used by the Small Business Administration (“SBA”). Id. Later, 
the Commission expanded its use of the eligible entity definition 
by applying it in other contexts. For instance, its rules have 
aimed to give these entities financing preferences, provide them 
with construction extensions, and generally encourage them to 
own broadcast operations. See Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 442 
n.9.  
 The Commission, at least until recently, has defended its 
                                              
6 Strict scrutiny requires a showing that preferences “are 
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling 
governmental interests.” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.  
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revenue-based definition as a legally supportable means of 
promoting minority and female ownership because the criteria 
are race and gender neutral. However, the main criticism has 
been that there is a lack of evidence showing that small 
businesses are more likely to be owned by minorities or females. 
See Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 470. Several parties have 
therefore asked the FCC to use a definition that gives 
preferences to “socially and economically disadvantaged 
businesses” (“SDBs”).  
B. Prometheus I and its aftermath 
 In Prometheus I we remanded portions of the 
Quadrennial Review proceedings to the FCC, but we rejected as 
premature a challenge to the revenue-based eligible entity 
definition. We credited the FCC’s contention that, “because of 
pending legislation, the definition of SDBs is currently too 
uncertain to be the basis of its regulation.” Prometheus I, 373 
F.3d at 428 n.70. However, we noted our anticipation that “by 
the next quadrennial review the Commission will have the 
benefit of a stable definition of SDBs, as well as several years of 
implementation experience, to help it reevaluate whether an 
SDB-based [definition] will better promote the Commission’s 
diversity objectives.” Id. Our anticipation turned out to be overly 
optimistic, and to date the Commission still has not employed 
any alternative definitions for eligible entities.  
 The next Quadrennial Review after Prometheus I was the 
2006 cycle. In connection with this review, the Commission 
released a notice of proposed rulemaking in the summer of 
2006. This notice, however, sidestepped questions over how to 
define SDBs. Commissioner Copps argued at the time that the 
notice’s failure to address minority and female ownership 
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violated our instructions from Prometheus I. See Prometheus II, 
652 F.3d at 466 & n.33. The next year, the FCC issued another 
notice of proposed rulemaking that acknowledged the failings of 
the previous notice. It took note of two arguments that 
supporters of an SDB-based definition raised against the first 
notice: 1) that “the concept of SDBs is central to most . . . 
minority ownership initiatives” and 2) that “without a definition 
for SDBs, the Commission cannot effectively” comply with 
Prometheus I. Id. at 467 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 Notwithstanding these contentions, the second notice 
“did not provide descriptions of any existing proposals for SDB 
definitions . . . or discuss the Commission’s analysis of existing 
briefing on those proposals’ constitutionality or efficacy.” Id. 
Ultimately, the second notice did not do much with respect to 
the eligible entity definition. It “merely called for general 
comment on [the] proposal that the Commission define SDBs 
for purposes of analyzing policy initiatives in support of media 
ownership diversity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 At the same time it overhauled a number of its rules in 
the 2008 Order based on the 2006 Quadrennial Review, the 
Commission issued the Diversity Order. That order, however, 
did not consider proposed SDB-based definitions that had been 
submitted to the Commission. Id. at 468. A large part of the 
problem was inadequate data. An independent review concluded 
that “all the researchers (and the peer reviewers) agree that the 
FCC’s databases on minority and female ownership are 
inaccurate and incomplete and their use for policy analysis 
would be fraught with risk.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Two Commissioners dissented in part from the order. 
Commissioner Copps specifically emphasized that the 
Commission already should have started “getting an accurate 
count of minority and female ownership.” Id. at 469 (internal 
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quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the order kept the 
revenue-based eligible entity definition.  
 In connection with the Diversity Order, the FCC also 
released another notice of proposed rulemaking that sought 
comment on using the SBA’s definition of an SDB (as opposed 
to the SBA’s revenue-based definition of a small business). Its 
SDB definition uses both social and economic criteria. For the 
former category, “[s]ocially disadvantaged individuals are those 
who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural 
bias within American society because of their identities as 
members of groups and without regard to their individual 
qualities. The social disadvantage must stem from circumstances 
beyond their control.” 13 C.F.R. § 124.103. Members of certain 
groups, including African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and 
Native Americans, get a rebuttable presumption that they 
qualify. Id. Meanwhile, the economic definition encompasses 
“socially disadvantaged individuals [as defined above] whose 
ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been 
impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as 
compared to others in the same or similar line of business who 
are not socially disadvantaged.” Id. § 124.104. 
 Two years later, in 2010, the Commission’s own group of 
experts, the Advisory Committee on Diversity for 
Communications in the Digital Age, proposed another possible 
eligible entity definition. It would give a preference “for 
individuals who have faced substantial disadvantages and 
overcome those disadvantages.” See Joint Appendix 984. This is 
known as the overcoming disadvantages preference (“ODP”). 
As examples of potential disadvantages, the Committee 
mentioned: 1) physical disabilities or psychological disorders; 2) 
physical or emotional trauma due to military service; 3) unequal 
access to higher education; 4) unequal access to credit; 5) 
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unequal treatment in hiring or promotions; 6) exclusion without 
cause from business, professional, or social associations; 7) 
retaliatory or discriminatory behavior by an employer or school; 
and 8) social patterns or pressures. Id. at 987. The Committee 
concluded that the proposal would not trigger heightened 
scrutiny because “the program would not award preferences on 
the basis of an applicant’s ethnicity or gender.” Id. at 993. As a 
result, it predicted that courts would apply rational basis review. 
Id.7  
C. Prometheus II 
 Although the Commission sought comments on using the 
SBA’s social and economic criteria and the Advisory Committee 
on Diversity for Communications in the Digital Age separately 
proposed a definition based on having overcome disadvantages, 
the revenue-based definition was still the one in place (and the 
only one the FCC had formally considered) by the time we 
decided Prometheus II. In that decision we found the revenue-
based definition to be arbitrary and capricious and remanded the 
matter to the Commission. Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 469–71. 
This put a freeze on all ongoing initiatives that relied on an 
eligible entity definition. We concluded that, “[f]irst and 
foremost, the Diversity Order does not explain how the eligible 
entity definition adopted would increase broadcast ownership by 
                                              
7 Under rational basis review, “a classification . . . comes to us 
bearing a strong presumption of validity, and those attacking 
[its] rationality . . . have the burden to negat[e] every 
conceivable basis which might support it.” FCC v. Beach 
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993) (internal 




minorities and women.” Id. at 470. We also said that  
it is hard to understand how measures using this 
definition would achieve the stated goal. For 
example, by the Commission’s own calculations, 
minorities comprise 8.5% of commercial radio 
station owners that qualify as small businesses 
[under the revenue-based definition], but 7.78% 
of the commercial radio industry as a whole—a 
difference of less than 1%. Thus, these measures 
cannot be expected to have much effect on 
minority ownership. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). We noted also that “the 
Commission referenced no data on television ownership by 
minorities or women and no data regarding commercial radio 
ownership by women. This is because, as the Commission has 
since conceded, it has no accurate data to cite.” Id. (emphases in 
original).  
  At the time of Prometheus II, an FCC initiative to fix the 
data problem was underway. Specifically, in the spring of 2009 
the Commission issued another notice of proposed rulemaking 
along with a report and order that instituted certain changes. The 
principal efforts related to Form 323, which the FCC uses to 
track race, ethnic origin, and gender data for broadcast licensees. 
Prior to 2009, full-power commercial AM, FM, and television 
broadcast stations typically had to file Form 323 biennially, but 
many other types of entities were exempt. The 2009 initiative 
ended the exemption for sole proprietorships, partnerships 
comprised of natural persons, and low-power television stations. 
See Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting 
Services, 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the 
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Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules 
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 24 F.C.C.R. 5896, ¶ 3 (Apr. 8, 2009). 
The FCC also directed that the format for filing Form 323 be 
changed so that a searchable database could be created. Id. ¶ 20.  
  The Commission expressed optimism that these changes, 
along with others outlined in the document, would fix the data 
gap. Id. ¶ 12 (“We believe that the changes we are adopting 
today adequately address [the] criticisms and will allow us to 
undertake studies that reliably analyze minority and female 
ownership.”). Our reaction to these efforts in Prometheus II was 
that, while “this is certainly a welcome and long overdue step, it 
does not remedy the existing data gap in the Diversity Order.” 
Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 471.  
 After finding the eligible entity definition to be arbitrary 
and capricious in Prometheus II, we noted our expectations for 
how the FCC should proceed on remand. First, we 
“anticipate[d]” that the Form 323 changes would “lay necessary 
groundwork for the Commission’s actions.” Id. Next, we 
directed the Commission to consider proposed eligible entity 
definitions before completing the 2010 Quadrennial Review. Id. 
(“We conclude . . . that the FCC did not provide a sufficiently 
reasoned basis for deferring consideration of the proposed SDB 
definitions and remand for it to do so before it completes its 
2010 Quadrennial Review.”); see also id. at 472 (“[W]e re-
emphasize that the actions required on remand should be 
completed within the course of the Commission’s 2010 
Quadrennial Review of its media ownership rules.”). 
Consideration of the proposals was particularly urgent because, 
“[d]espite our prior remand requiring the Commission to 
consider the effect of its rules on minority and female 
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ownership, and anticipating a workable SDB definition well 
before this rulemaking was completed, the Commission has in 
large part punted yet again on this important issue.” Id. at 471. 
 We cautioned that the FCC could not merely fall back on 
Adarand to justify further delays: “Stating that the task is 
difficult in light of Adarand does not constitute ‘considering’ 
proposals using an SDB definition.” Id. at 471 n.42. We also 
addressed the data gap, concluding that the “FCC’s own failure 
to collect or analyze data, and lay other necessary groundwork, 
may help to explain, but does not excuse, its failure to consider 
the proposals presented over many years. If the Commission 
requires more and better data to complete the necessary Adarand 
studies, it must get the data and conduct up-to-date studies . . . .” 
Id. Despite these concerns, we were nonetheless “encouraged 
that the FCC has taken steps” to plug the data gap, and we 
anticipated that it would “act with diligence to synthesize and 
release existing data such that studies will be available for 
public review in time for the completion of the 2010 
Quadrennial Review.” Id. 
D. Aftermath of Prometheus II 
 In December 2011 (five months after Prometheus II), as 
part of its report on the still ongoing 2010 Quadrennial Review, 
the Commission once again punted, citing data concerns. It 
wrote:  
We recognize that the data currently in the record 
of this proceeding are not complete and are likely 
insufficient either to address the concerns raised 
in Prometheus II or to support race- or gender-
based actions by the Commission. Although we 
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would prefer to be able to propose specific actions 
in response to the Third Circuit’s remand of the 
measures relying on the eligible entity 
definition . . ., we believe that making legally 
sound proposals would not be possible based on 
the record before us at this time. 
2010 Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the 
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules 
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 F.C.C.R. 17489, 
¶ 158 (Dec. 22, 2011). It then committed to undertaking the 
following initiatives in anticipation of the 2014 Quadrennial 
Review:  
1) Continue to improve our data collection so that 
we and the public may more easily identify the 
diverse range of broadcast owners, including 
women and minorities, in all services we license; 
2) Commission appropriately-tailored research and 
analysis on diversity of ownership; and 3) Conduct 
workshops on the opportunities and challenges 
facing diverse populations in broadcast ownership. 
In addition, we ask interested parties to supplement 
the record and provide any and all data available 
that can complete a picture of the current state of 
ownership diversity, including minority and female 
ownership in the broadcast industry[,] and to 
justify any prospective actions the Commission 




 Also in anticipation of the 2014 review, the Commission 
sought comments about whether it should keep the revenue-
based eligible entity definition. Specifically, it asked whether 
there was any “additional evidence available that would show a 
stronger connection” between using that definition and 
promoting minority and female ownership. Id. ¶ 160. It also 
asked whether “other policy objectives aside from the promotion 
of minority and female station ownership,” such as encouraging 
ownership by small businesses, might support using a revenue-
based definition. Id. ¶ 161. With respect to alternative 
definitions of eligible entities, the FCC once again sought 
comment on whether to use the SBA’s social and economic 
preferences. Id. ¶ 163. It also asked about any other definitions 
that commenters might suggest. Id.  
 The next year, the Commission released a document 
known as the 2012 323 Report, which provides analysis of the 
first two rounds of reporting under the revised biennial Form 
323 requirements. It concluded that the new approach was 
working: “These data represent the first two snapshots of 
broadcast ownership in a series of planned biennial data 
collections that, taken together, should provide a reliable basis 
for analyzing ownership trends in the industry, including 
ownership by racial and ethnic minorities and women.” 2012 
323 Report, 27 F.C.C.R. 13814, ¶ 2 (Nov. 14, 2012). The results 
confirmed the underrepresentation of minorities and women. For 
instance, as of the 2011 Form 323 reporting period, racial 
minorities had majority ownership of just 2.2 percent of full-
power commercial television stations. Id. ¶ 7. For women, that 
number was 6.8 percent. Id. ¶ 5.  
 Finally, in the 2014 FNPRM & Order, the FCC addressed 
our Prometheus II remand, saying: “As directed by the court, we 
consider the socially and economically disadvantaged business 
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definition as a possible basis for favorable regulatory treatment, 
as well as other possible definitions that would expressly 
recognize the race and ethnicity of applicants.” 2014 FNPRM & 
Order ¶ 7. However, it tentatively rejected them. And although 
it “concede[d] that we do not have an evidentiary record 
demonstrating that this standard specifically increases minority 
and female broadcast ownership,” the Commission tentatively 
recommended reinstating the revenue-based standard that we 
had rejected in Prometheus II as arbitrary and capricious. Id. 
¶ 267. It reasoned that, “even in the absence of such evidence, 
we believe that reinstatement of the revenue-based standard 
would serve the public interest by promoting small-business 
participation in the broadcast industry.” Id.  
 In evaluating SDB-based—as opposed to revenue-
based—proposals, the Commission never considered whether 
they would increase minority and female ownership. Rather, it 
rejected them on the ground that they would not, on the current 
record, survive constitutional scrutiny. First, the Commission 
considered whether it could establish a compelling 
governmental interest, as required to pass strict scrutiny. It 
concluded that its “interest in promoting a diversity of 
viewpoints could be deemed sufficiently compelling to survive 
strict scrutiny analysis.” Id. ¶ 286. However, it determined that 
there was not enough record evidence to meet strict scrutiny’s 
narrow tailoring requirement. Id. ¶ 282. 
 In support of that conclusion, the Commission walked 
through the studies in the administrative record. It determined 
that two “directly address the impact of minority ownership on 
viewpoint diversity.” Id. ¶ 292. The first, Media Ownership 
Study 8A, found that “the relationship between minority 
ownership and viewpoint diversity is not statistically 
distinguishable from zero.” Id. The second, Media Ownership 
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Study 8B, found “almost no statistically significant relationship 
between [minority] ownership and . . . viewpoint diversity.” Id. 
¶ 293. The exception in 8B was a positive correlation between 
minority ownership and coverage of minority politicians. Id.  
 The Commission also looked at studies that found a 
connection between minority ownership and diversity of 
programming or format. For instance, Media Ownership Study 7 
showed that the “presence of minority-owned stations increases 
the amount of minority-targeted programming and that the 
availability of minority-targeted formats attracts more minorities 
to listening.” Id. ¶ 294. Another study determined that “72.5 
percent . . . of minority-owned radio stations broadcast minority-
oriented formats, including Spanish, Urban, Urban News, Asian, 
Ethnic and Religious formats geared to minority audiences.” Id. 
¶ 296. However, the FCC concluded that these studies were not 
helpful because, though they tie minority ownership to diversity, 
they do not relate to viewpoint diversity. Id. ¶ 294 (“We do not 
believe that evidence regarding program or other forms of 
diversity is as relevant as evidence regarding viewpoint diversity 
for the purpose of establishing narrow tailoring to a compelling 
interest.”). The Commission based this determination on its 
reading of Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622 (1994), which it said stands for the principle that viewpoint 
diversity in broadcasting is an interest “of the highest order.” 
2014 FNPRM & Order ¶ 294 & n.888 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 Based on this review, the FCC concluded that the studies 
“begin to answer” some of the questions necessary for a strict 
scrutiny analysis but “do not demonstrate the nearly complete or 
tightly bound nexus between diversity of viewpoint and minority 
ownership that would be required to justify a race-based eligible 
entity definition.” Id. ¶ 298 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The Commission also tentatively determined that the record did 
not “reveal a feasible means of carrying out the type of 
individualized consideration the Supreme Court has held is 
required to pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny.” Id. 
¶ 299. It noted that, although the Supreme Court has approved 
the use of racial preferences in higher education, the “manner in 
which the Commission allocates broadcast licenses is different 
in many important respects from university admissions, and we 
believe that implementing a program for awarding or affording 
preferences related to broadcast licenses based on the 
‘individualized review’ required in other contexts would pose a 
number of administrative and practical challenges for the 
Commission.” Id.  
 The Commission also gave limited attention to the 
proposed ODP (overcoming disadvantages preference) standard. 
At the outset, it said that “it is not entirely clear whether the . . . 
standard would be subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny.” 
Id. ¶ 300. This is so even if the standard would not mention race 
or gender and would instead focus on disadvantages that anyone 
could face. The Commission reasoned that a standard that does 
not “facially include race-conscious criteria, yet is constructed 
for the purpose of promoting minority ownership, might be 
subject to heightened scrutiny.” Id. ¶ 300 n.915. It also noted: 
Among other issues, no commenter provided 
input on (1) what social or economic 
disadvantages should be cognizable under an 
ODP standard,8 (2) how the Commission could 
validate claims of eligibility for ODP status, (3) 
                                              
8 The Commission’s apparent lack of awareness of the types of 
cognizable disadvantages is surprising. As discussed, its own 
advisory group supplied a list of proposed types in 2010.    
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whether applicants should bear the burden of 
proving specifically that they would contribute to 
diversity as a result of having overcome certain 
disadvantages, (4) how the Commission could 
measure the overcoming of a disadvantage if an 
applicant is a widely held corporation rather than 
an entity with a single majority shareholder or a 
small number of control persons, and (5) how the 
Commission could evaluate the effectiveness of 
the use of an ODP standard. 
 Id. ¶ 300.  
 Next, the Commission considered the possibility of 
preferences that focused on gender alone, as these would trigger 
intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. It concluded: 
While we acknowledge that the data show that 
women-owned stations are not represented in 
proportion to the presence of women in the 
overall population, we do not believe that the 
evidence available at this time reveals that the 
content provided via women-owned broadcast 
stations substantially contributes to viewpoint 
diversity in a manner different from other stations 
or otherwise varies significantly from that 
provided by other stations. 
Id. ¶ 301. 
 Finally, the FCC rejected the notion that its approach 
violated our remand in Prometheus II. The crux of its argument 
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is that we said it needed to consider adopting an SDB-based 
definition in connection with the 2010 Quadrennial Review, 
which technically has not ended yet because it was rolled into 
the 2014 cycle (which, in turn, is not yet complete). As it 
explained: 
The Commission intends to follow the Third 
Circuit’s direction that we consider adopting an 
SDB definition before completion of this 
proceeding and evaluate the feasibility of 
adopting a race-conscious eligibility standard 
based on an extensive analysis of the available 
evidence. We do not believe that the Third Circuit 
intended to prejudge the outcome of our analysis 
of the evidence or the feasibility of implementing 
a race-conscious standard that would be 
consistent both with applicable legal standards 
and the Commission’s practices and procedures. 
Id. ¶ 283.  
E. Discussion 
 With 12 years having passed since Prometheus I, we 
conclude that the Commission has had more than enough time to 
reach a decision on the eligible entity definition. We put it on 
notice of our concerns five years ago in Prometheus II. 652 F.3d 
at 471. We directed it to take action in the course of the 2010 
Quadrennial Review, id., and then we returned to that topic 
again to “re-emphasize” our directive, id. at 472. However, the 
Commission has not complied.  
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 In light of this history, the Oil, Chemical & Atomic 
Workers Union factors for evaluating requests under APA 
§ 706(1) all counsel in favor of finding an unreasonable delay. 
First, we must consider “the length of time that has elapsed 
since the agency came under a duty to act.” Oil, Chemical & 
Atomic Workers Union, 145 F.3d at 123. Here the duty to act 
arose as early as 2004 as a result of our Prometheus I decision 
and became even more explicit in Prometheus II. Second, we 
must judge “the reasonableness of the delay . . . in the context of 
the statute authorizing the agency’s action.” Id. Federal law 
imposes on the Commission an obligation to promote ownership 
by minorities and women. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(i), (j). As such, 
we have described promoting minority and female ownership as 
an “important aspect of the overall media ownership regulatory 
framework.” Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 472. Third, we need to 
“assess the consequences of the agency’s delay.” Oil, Chemical 
& Atomic Workers Union, 145 F.3d at 123. In our case, the 
consequence is that several initiatives pegged to a workable 
eligible entity definition cannot take effect. Finally, we have to 
look at “any plea of administrative error, administrative 
inconvenience, practical difficulty in carrying out a legislative 
mandate, or need to prioritize in the face of limited resources.” 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We already have 
determined that difficulty in collecting data does not justify the 
delay here. See Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 471 n.42. 
 In another context, we have ordered action under APA 
§ 706(1) when an agency had delayed for nine years. See Public 
Citizen Health Research Group, 314 F.3d at 153 (“We find 
extreme OSHA’s nine-year (and counting) delay since 
announcing its intention to begin the rulemaking process, even 
relative to delays other courts have condemned in comparable 
cases.”). Here more than a decade has passed since Prometheus 
I. Although “we are sympathetic to [the] claim that a 
thorough . . . analysis is both highly important and quite 
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difficult, we cannot allow an imperfect analysis to justify 
indefinite delay.” Id. at 156.  
 The FCC presents two arguments for why we should not 
order relief. Both fail. The first is that it is not yet in violation of 
Prometheus II because we instructed it to address the eligible 
entity definition during the 2010 Quadrennial Review, which is 
still ongoing. This contention improperly attempts to use one 
delay (the Quadrennial Review) to excuse another (the eligible 
entity definition). By this logic, the Commission could delay 
another decade or more without running afoul of our remand. 
Simply put, it cannot evade our remand merely by keeping the 
2010 review open indefinitely.  
 The second reason is that the FCC’s Chairman has 
committed to circulating to the other Commissioners by June 30 
of this year an order taking final action on the eligible entity 
definition. Counsel for the Commission said at oral argument 
that it was reasonable to expect that the order would be finalized 
and adopted by the end of year. See Oral Arg. Tr. at 46. The 
D.C. Circuit encountered a similar request from the FCC for 
forbearance in In re Core Communications, Inc., 531 F.3d 849 
(D.C. Cir. 2008). There, as the Court was considering whether to 
mandate action after the Commission had violated a remand 
order, counsel said that ordering relief was not necessary 
because “the Commission [was] on the brink of concluding” its 
obligations. Id. at 858. The Court rejected the request to stay its 
hand, observing that “[w]e have heard this refrain before.” Id. 
So have we. The Commission justified delay in Prometheus I on 
the basis of pending legislation. In Prometheus II it did the same 
based on data concerns but said that better data was forthcoming 
due to the Form 323 revisions.  
 Moreover, although we appreciate the Chairman’s 
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commitment to prompt action, it is not reason enough to refrain 
from issuing an order, particularly because his desire to move 
quickly does not bind his fellow Commissioners. As the D.C. 
Circuit aptly explained,  
the Chairman’s doing “everything he can” may 
not suffice, as he may not be able to enforce his 
will on his fellow Commissioners. In any event, 
the representation is not enforceable unless 
backed up by issuance of [an order]. At some 
point, promises are no longer enough, and we 
must end the game of administrative keep-away. 
Id. at 859 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, although we 
expect that the Commission will meet the proposed deadline, in 
light of the previous delays we find it necessary to back up that 
expectation with an order.  
 We therefore remand and order the Commission, 
pursuant to APA § 706(1), to act promptly to bring the eligible 
entity definition to a close.9 It must make a final determination 
as to whether to adopt a new definition. If it needs more data to 
do so, it must get it. We do not intend to prejudge the outcome 
of this analysis; we only order that it must be completed. Once 
the agency issues a final order either adopting an SDB- or ODP-
based definition (or something similar) or concluding that it 
cannot do so, any aggrieved parties will be able to seek judicial 
review. 
                                              
9 Because a writ of mandamus would not provide anything other 
than what we are granting under the APA, we need not rule on 




 Though we readily conclude that the time for prompt 
action has arrived, the harder issue is determining what 
“prompt” should mean. Recognizing that the parties are in a 
better position than us to understand the complexities of what is 
required, we proposed at oral argument the possibility of 
following our approach in Public Citizen Health Research 
Group, where we turned to mediation after ordering APA 
§ 706(1) relief. The parties agreed to this approach, and as a 
result we order mediation between Citizen Petitioners and the 
Commission for purposes of fixing a timetable for final agency 
action.10 However, we include here the same caveat that we did 
in Public Citizen Health Research Group: If the parties are not 
able to agree within 60 days on an appropriate timeline, we will 
promulgate a schedule that we deem appropriate. See 314 F.3d 
at 159.11  
                                              
10 Apart from setting a schedule, we also encourage the parties 
to discuss the substance of the eligible entity proposals, as well 
as other ways, outside of the eligible entity context, for the 
Commission to fulfill its statutory obligation to foster diversity. 
 
11 Multicultural Media, Telecom and Internet Council 
(“MMTC”), an intervenor, raises an argument that relates in 
many ways to the eligible entity discussion. Specifically, MMTC 
contends that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
in declining to address 24 diversity-related proposals that were 
suggested by a coalition of national organizations. Several of 
these proposals would benefit from a revised eligible entity 
definition. The Commission noted that the proposals “are 
accompanied by detailed and thoughtful analysis” and that 
“some of them may warrant further consideration.” 2014 
FNPRM & Order ¶ 317. However, it tentatively determined that 
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IV. Failure to Complete Quadrennial Review 
 Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
uses unmistakably mandatory language in describing the 
Commission’s obligations. It provides that the Commission 
“shall” review its rules on broadcast ownership every four years, 
“shall determine whether any of such rules are necessary in the 
public interest as the result of competition,” and “shall repeal or 
modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public 
interest.” This repeated use of “shall” creates “an obligation 
impervious to . . . discretion.” Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss 
                                                                                                     
it would not address them during the 2014 review because “they 
are outside the scope of this proceeding.” Id. The FCC based 
this conclusion on its representation that the proposals “involve 
cable operators and other non-broadcast services that are outside 
the scope of our quadrennial review proceedings” and/or 
“ultimately would require legislative action or action by other 
federal entities aside from the Commission in order to create 
changes in rules or policies.” Id. In supplemental briefing 
MMTC identified a substantial number of proposals to which it 
says neither reason applies.  
 
 The Commission responds that MMTC’s challenge is 
premature because the decision not to consider the proposals 
was tentative rather than final. It also represents that it will deal 
with them in the document that the Chairman has committed to 
circulating by June 30, 2016. Because MMTC only seeks here to 
void agency action it considers to be arbitrary and capricious 
and does not raise a claim of undue delay, we set aside its 
challenge as premature but note our expectation that the 




Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998). Indeed, the 
very purpose of § 202(h)—to function as an “ongoing 
mechanism to ensure that the Commission’s regulatory 
framework would keep pace with the competitive changes in the 
marketplace,” Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 391 (internal quotation 
marks omitted)—reinforces the need for timeliness.  
 Despite this command from Congress, the last review that 
the Commission completed was, as noted, the 2006 cycle. The 
order ending that review was adopted in December 2007 and 
released in February 2008, and it led to Prometheus II. Since 
2008, more than eight years—enough time for two review 
cycles—have passed without any final action. In 2014, the 
Commission said it was “cognizant” of its “statutory obligation 
to review the broadcast ownership rules every four years,” but it 
concluded, based on deficiencies in the record, that it was 
unable to wrap up the 2010 review. 2014 FNPRM & Order ¶ 1. 
As a result, it rolled that review into the 2014 cycle, which is 
still ongoing.  
 Asked repeatedly at oral argument to explain the reason 
for the delay, the Commission was unable to provide a cogent 
response. And we note that at least one Commissioner shares 
our confusion. See Statement of Commissioner Ajit Pai, 
Dissenting, 29 F.C.C.R. 4371, 4587 (Mar. 31, 2014) (“Pai 
Dissent”) (“Our decision today—or, to be more accurate, our 
lack of decision—is a thumb in the eye of Congress and an 
evasion of our legal obligations. What makes it even worse is 
that [the 2014 FNPRM & Order] contains no meaningful 
explanation for why we are not resolving the quadrennial 
review.”).   
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A. The costs of delay 
 The Commission’s delay keeps five broadcast ownership 
rules in limbo: the local television ownership rule, the local 
radio ownership rule, the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership 
(“NBCO”) rule, the radio/television cross-ownership rule, and 
the dual network rule.12 We provided an overview of these rules 
in our 2011 decision. See Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 438–42. 
Because the challenge here is not to the content of the rules, but 
rather relates to the consequence of the Commission’s delay, we 
need not repeat that summary here. 
 Though a full exploration of the rules is not necessary, a 
brief discussion of one of them, the NBCO rule, provides a 
telling example of why the delay is so problematic. The rule, 
which dates back to 1975, prohibits common ownership of a 
daily newspaper and a television or radio station in the same 
market. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d). As part of its 2002 review, 
the FCC determined that a complete ban was no longer in the 
public interest but that some restrictions were. See Prometheus I, 
373 F.3d at 400–01. We agreed with this premise in Prometheus 
I. Id. at 398–400. However, we concluded that the particular 
proposal that the FCC adopted to replace the complete ban was 
arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 402. The result was to leave the 
1975 ban in place.  
 The Commission tried again during the 2006 cycle, but 
we determined in Prometheus II that its new attempt did not 
comply with the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. 
                                              
12 The national television ownership rule used to be included in 
the review as well, but Congress has withdrawn it from the 
purview of § 202(h). See Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 389. 
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Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 445. Once again, our conclusion 
resulted in the complete ban staying on the books. In the 2014 
FNPRM & Order, the Commission struggled to find a way to 
make the rule work, and it discussed the possibility of leaving 
radio/newspaper combinations unregulated and limiting its 
restrictions to television/newspaper cross-ownership. See 2014 
FNPRM & Order ¶¶ 113–20.  
 As a result, the 1975 ban remains in effect to this day 
even though the FCC determined more than a decade ago that it 
is no longer in the public interest. This has come at significant 
expense to parties that would be able, under some of the less 
restrictive options being considered by the Commission, to 
engage in profitable combinations. The delay also hampers 
judicial review because there is no final agency action to 
challenge. Cf. Core Communications, 531 F.3d at 856 
(“Moreover, until the FCC states its explanation for its interim 
rules in a final order, Core cannot mount a challenge to those 
rules. In this way, the FCC insulates [itself] . . . from further 
review.”). 
B. Vacatur is not appropriate 
 Deregulatory Petitioners argue that the result of this delay 
should be to vacate all five broadcast ownership rules that are 
subject to § 202(h). This would wipe the slate clean. And, unless 
the Commission were immediately to issue new rules, it would 
lead to a degree of deregulation that is unprecedented in the 
modern broadcast industry.  
 Despite asking for such sweeping relief, Deregulatory 
Petitioners do not cite a single instance when a court has ordered 
mass vacatur in similar circumstances. There is a reason for this: 
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Vacatur typically is inappropriate where it is “conceivable” that 
the Commission can, if given the opportunity, create a 
supportable rule. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Here, 
despite the delay, we have no reason to suspect that the 
Commission cannot justify at least some restrictions on 
broadcast ownership.  
 We must also consider the “disruptive consequences of 
vacating.” Id. In this case, vacatur risks creating a temporary 
free-for-all in the broadcast industry, with companies racing to 
engage in previously prohibited combinations before the FCC 
comes forward with new regulations. This would invite chaos, 
and it presumably would lead to drawn-out litigation over 
whether combinations entered into during this vacuum could 
continue to exist even if the Commission later determined to 
outlaw them once again. 
 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 
(D.C. Cir.), opinion modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 
2002), which Deregulatory Petitioners cite as support for 
vacatur, is not contrary to our conclusion. There the D.C. Circuit 
said that if “the reviewing court lacked the power to require the 
Commission to vacate a rule it had improperly retained [during a 
Quadrennial Review] and could require the Commission only to 
reconsider its decision, then the presumption in § 202(h) would 
lose much of its bite.” Id. at 1048. This is a reference to the 
notion that “Section 202(h) carries with it a presumption in 
favor of repealing or modifying the ownership rules.” Id.  
 At the outset, we note that there is little left of this 
presumption in light of subsequent clarifications from both the 
D.C. Circuit and our Court. See Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 357 F.3d 
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88, 97–99 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 394–95. 
Quibbling aside, we agree that vacatur is sometimes appropriate 
in the § 202(h) context. It is most likely appropriate in the 
setting the D.C. Circuit described in Fox—when the 
Commission has reached a final (but unsupportable) decision to 
retain, rather than repeal or modify, a rule. Here the Commission 
has not reached any final determinations. Deregulatory 
Petitioners are not complaining of improper agency action; 
rather, their problem is with agency delay. When an agency 
gives its reasoning for retaining a rule and a court concludes that 
it is insufficient and incapable of being cured, vacatur makes 
sense. With no final justifications to review, however, we cannot 
be convinced that it would be futile to allow the Commission to 
try to come to a supportable conclusion. 
 That is not to say that vacatur is never an appropriate 
response when the allegation is agency delay rather than 
arbitrary and capricious agency action. For instance, in Core 
Communications the D.C. Circuit gave the Commission six 
months to justify certain rules or have them wiped from the 
books. Core Communications, 531 F.3d at 861. There, however, 
the Court had twice remanded the issue to the Commission, 
which had delayed action for six years after the second remand. 
Id. at 850. That situation is analogous to the Commission’s 
delays on the eligible entity definition. Here, by contrast, the 
delay did not begin until after Prometheus II. Though its delay is 
troubling, the Commission was not on notice that its tardiness 
might result in vacatur.  
C. Deregulatory Petitioners have waived other forms of relief 
 There is yet another reason why vacatur is inappropriate: 
Deregulatory Petitioners could have sought relief in the form of 
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an order under APA § 706(1) or a writ of mandamus. Under 
either of these provisions, we could have ordered the 
Commission to resolve promptly its 2010 and 2014 review 
cycles. This route, rather than vacatur, typically is the 
appropriate remedy to agency delay. See Cellco P’ship, 357 F.3d 
at 101. However, unlike Citizen Petitioners, who specifically 
sought APA § 706(1) and mandamus relief, Deregulatory 
Petitioners abandoned those requests.  
 Of the petitions for review, the only one to take issue 
with the delayed Quadrennial Review process was filed by the 
National Association of Broadcasters (“NAB”). It charges the 
Commission with “unlawfully withhold[ing]” action, but it 
requests vacatur as the remedy and never gives any indication 
(apart from a generic plea for any relief we deem appropriate) 
that it seeks an order mandating action. See NAB Petition for 
Review at 3, 5. Similarly, the sole remedy that Deregulatory 
Petitioners request in their opening brief is vacatur. They cite 
§ 706(1) in their reply brief, but only in a footnote in that 
document do they even mention remedies other than complete 
vacatur. Specifically, they suggest that, if “the Court does not 
vacate the rules outright, it should at minimum vacate with a stay 
to urge quick action or remand with direction to act 
immediately.” Deregulatory Petitioners’ Reply Br. at 11 n.2 
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).  
 By focusing their energy on vacatur, Deregulatory 
Petitioners went for a home run. Instead, they have struck out. 
Now they find themselves with alternative requests that are not 
singly, but rather doubly, waived: first because they were raised 
for the first time in a reply brief, and second because they were 
relegated to a footnote. See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 
197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an appellant’s 
failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief 
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constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”); John Wyeth & Bro. 
Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1997) (“[A]rguments raised in passing (such as, in a footnote), 
but not squarely argued, are considered waived.”). As a result, 
we decline to order APA § 706(1) or mandamus relief.  
 Our conclusion that Deregulatory Petitioners have 
litigated themselves out of relief, however, should not be 
confused with a green light for further agency delay. At oral 
argument, counsel for the Commission made the same assurance 
here as he did in the context of the eligible entity definition: that 
the Chairman intends to circulate an order to the other 
Commissioners by June 30 of this year, with the expectation 
being that it would be finalized and adopted by the end of the 
year. See Oral Arg. Tr. at 46. The order, we are told, would 
bring the 2010 and 2014 Quadrennial Reviews to a close. Id. at 
41, 46.13 We fully anticipate that the Commission will meet this 
deadline. However, if it fails to complete the reviews by then, it 
does so at its own risk. New litigation would likely result, and 
the outcome may well be different.  
                                              
13 We note that, in addition to § 202(h)’s requirement to review 
the rules to see if they are necessary in light of competition, the 
Quadrennial Review must also, per our previous decisions, 
include a determination about “the effect of [the] rules on 
minority and female ownership.” Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 
471. In studying this, the Commission should consider how the 
ongoing broadcast incentive auction affects minority and female 
ownership.   
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V. The Joint Sales Agreement Rule 
 The Commission places restrictions on common 
ownership of broadcast television stations. For instance, the 
local television ownership rule allows “one entity to own two 
television stations [with overlapping contours] in a market (a 
television duopoly) as long as at least one of the stations was not 
ranked among the market’s four largest stations and at least 
eight independently owned and operated stations (called ‘eight 
voices’) would remain post-merger.” Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 
439. Imagine a market with ten overlapping stations: Stations 
A–J (with Stations A–D being the four largest). Clearly, the 
local television ownership rule prevents one company from 
owning Stations D, E, and F because there is a limit of two.  
 But what if a company owns Stations D and E and has a 
contract that gives it significant influence over station F? To 
answer this question, the Commission has “attribution” rules. If 
Station F is attributed to the owner of Stations D and E, it means 
that the latter is considered to own the former for purposes of 
the Commission’s ownership caps. The purpose of attribution 
rules is to prevent companies from circumventing ownership 
limits by doing through clever contracting what they are not 
permitted to do through outright purchases of stations.  
 In 2014, the Commission created a new attribution rule 
for television joint sales agreements (“JSAs”). A JSA is a 
contract that allows one station (the brokering station) to sell 
advertising (but not programming) on a second station (the 
brokered station). Specifically, the FCC determined that same-
market JSAs involving the sale of more than 15 percent of the 
brokered station’s weekly advertising will be attributed (i.e., 
counted toward ownership caps). See 2014 FNPRM & Order 
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¶ 340. Returning to our example, if the owner of Stations D and 
E has a JSA over the 15-percent threshold with Station F, that 
arrangement would violate the Commission’s ownership rules. 
Importantly, the new rule does not outlaw JSAs over the 15-
percent limit; it just means that they must be counted toward 
ownership caps. For instance, a company that only owns one 
television station can have an attributable JSA with a second 
station without running afoul of the ownership limits (as long as 
the eight-voices and the four-largest-stations rules are not 
violated). Deregulatory Petitioners challenge the television JSA 
rule and argue that its enactment violated § 202(h).  
A. Background 
 The 2014 television JSA rule traces its roots to the 1990s, 
when the FCC first attributed local marketing agreements 
(“LMAs”). They are similar to JSAs, except that they involve 
the sale of programming as well as advertising on the brokered 
station. In 1992, the Commission attributed same-market radio 
LMAs over the 15-percent threshold. Revision of Radio Rules 
and Policies, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 2755, ¶ 65 (Mar. 12, 
1992). Seven years later, it extended that rule to cover same-
market television LMAs and once again used 15 percent as the 
limit. Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing 
Attribution of Broadcast and Cable/MDS Interests, Report and 
Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 12559, ¶ 83 (Aug. 5, 1999).  
 The Commission moved on to same-market radio JSAs as 
part of the 2002 § 202(h) review. 2002 Biennial Regulatory 
Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership 
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order and Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13620, ¶ 317 (June 2, 
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2003). We upheld the radio JSA attribution rule, which used the 
same 15-perent threshold, in Prometheus I. We determined that 
it was a “modification ‘in the public interest’ under § 202(h)” 
because attribution “prevent[ed] [the] local radio rule from 
being undermined.” Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 429. We also 
concluded that the rule was neither arbitrary nor capricious 
because the FCC “sufficiently rationalize[d] its decision to 
jettison its prior nonattribution policy and replace it with one 
that more accurately reflects the conditions of local markets.” Id. 
at 430.  
 In 2014, the Commission extended its rationale once 
more, this time to capture same-market television JSAs over the 
15-percent threshold. 2014 FNPRM & Order ¶ 340. It reasoned 
that the purpose of its attribution rules is to “identify those 
interests in licensees that confer on their holders a degree of 
influence or control such that the holders have a realistic 
potential to affect the programming decisions of licensees or 
other core operating functions.” Id. ¶ 343 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Employing this test, it found that television 
JSAs “have the potential to convey significant influence over a 
station’s operations such that they should be attributable.” Id. 
¶ 350.  
 Essentially, the Commission’s view is that JSAs over the 
15-percent threshold look enough like ownership to count as 
such. It wrote that  
JSAs provide incentives for joint operation that 
are similar to those created by common 
ownership. For example, when two stations are 
commonly owned, the paired stations may benefit 
by winning advertising accounts that are new to 
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both of them (rather than by having one co-owned 
station win an account from the other) and, 
possibly, by being able to raise advertising prices 
above those that they would obtain if the stations 
were independently owned. A broker selling 
advertising time on two stations, one of which is 
owned by the broker, has incentives similar to 
those of an owner of two stations to coordinate 
advertising activity between the two stations. 
 Id. ¶ 351.  
 The FCC said that its decision on television JSAs was 
“informed by our experience with the attribution of radio JSAs, 
which has operated to ensure that the goals of our radio 
ownership rules are not undermined by nonattributable 
agreements conferring the potential for significant influence 
over a station’s core operating functions.” Id. ¶ 349. See also id. 
¶ 350 (“Consistent with the Commission’s analysis supporting 
attribution of radio JSAs . . ., we now find that television JSAs 
involving a significant portion of the brokered station’s 
advertising time convey the incentive and potential for the 
broker to influence program selection and station operations.”). 
The FCC acknowledged that its decision to attribute same-
market television JSAs was a break from its past practice, and it 
described its previous nonattribution policy as “incorrect.” Id.  
 The Commission also dismissed as irrelevant comments 
that the public interest benefits of JSAs outweigh the concerns 
about undue influence: “We find . . . that those arguments bear 
on the issue of liberalization of [ownership caps] and not on the 
question of whether JSAs give the brokering station a degree of 
influence and control that rises to the level of attribution, which 
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is the sole focus of our inquiry here.” Id. ¶ 349. In other words, 
the Commission’s view is that if anyone wants to complain 
about the harm stemming from ownership restrictions, the 
proper thing to attack is the caps themselves. But as long as it is 
in the public interest to regulate ownership, the Commission 
says it has flexibility to prevent end-runs around its rules by 
regulating agreements that are the functional equivalent of 
ownership control. 
 As for setting the threshold at 15 percent, the FCC 
reasoned that it has “consistently applied [this number] to 
determine whether to attribute JSAs in radio markets and LMAs 
in both television and radio markets, and we find that it is 
appropriate to use that same [number] here.” Id. ¶ 360. It further 
explained that its rule  
will allow a station to broker a small amount of 
advertising time through a JSA with another 
station in the same market without triggering 
attribution, yet will fall short of providing the 
broker a significant incentive or ability to exert 
influence over the brokered station’s 
programming or other core operating functions 
because it will not be selling the advertising time 
in a substantial portion of the station’s 
programming. 
Id.  
 Finally, the Commission declined to include a 
grandfathering provision that would safeguard existing same-
market television JSAs over the 15-percent threshold. It found 
that “such grandfathering would allow arbitrary and inconsistent 
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changes to the level of permissible common ownership on a 
market-by-market basis based not necessarily on where the 
public interest lies, but rather on the current existence or 
nonexistence of television JSAs in that market when the new 
attribution rule becomes effective.” Id. ¶ 367. The Commission 
gave entities with existing JSAs two years to come into 
compliance with the new regulations, see id., but Congress has 
extended the deadline to 2025, see Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 628, 
129 Stat. 2242, 2469 (2015).  
 Of all the Commission’s ownership limits, the one most 
affected by the new policy is the local television ownership 
rule.14 In a dissent, Commissioner Pai faulted the Commission 
for changing the television JSA rule without determining, as part 
of a § 202(h) Quadrennial Review, that the local television 
ownership caps remain in the public interest. His view was that 
the Commission, before telling companies that they need to 
reduce the number of stations they own if counting JSAs puts 
them over the limit, needs to determine that it remains necessary 
even to have a limit in the first instance.  
 He wrote that the “merits of our attribution rules can’t be 
separated from the merits of our local television ownership 
rules. If, as the Commission submits, it is taking action today to 
‘prevent the circumvention of our ownership limits,’ then it 
follows that we are obliged to take into consideration arguments 
regarding the adequacy of those ownership limits.” Pai Dissent 
                                              
14 Although most of the debate about television JSA attribution 
has related to its effect on the local television ownership rule, 
the Commission has said the attribution standard would also 
apply to other rules that restrict television ownership. See 2014 
FNPRM & Order ¶ 363 & n.1119.  
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at 4596 (footnote omitted). He contrasted this with the 2002 
review, where the Commission “affirmatively decided” to 
maintain radio ownership limits (upon a finding that they were 
in the public interest) before determining that radio JSAs are 
attributable. Id. (“There was no attempt to dodge consideration 
of uncomfortable or inconvenient facts. By contrast, today’s 
item fails to decide whether our current local television 
ownership rule remains in the public interest, reserving the issue 
for another day—or more accurately, another year.”). 
Commissioner O’Rielly echoed Commissioner Pai’s statements, 
writing that “there is a distinct possibility that the record that 
develops as a result of our 2014 Quadrennial Review could 
require us to relax some of our TV ownership rules. That could 
make this effort to unwind JSAs a complete waste of time and 
money.” Statement of Commissioner Michael O’Rielly, 
Dissenting, 29 F.C.C.R. 4371, 4604 (Mar. 31, 2014). 
B. Discussion 
 In this context, Deregulatory Petitioners claim that the 
2014 television JSA rule violates § 202(h) because it amends the 
Commission’s ownership limits—in particular, the local 
television ownership rule—without concluding that the 
preexisting caps are in the public interest. Their argument is 
that, even if the failure to complete the Quadrennial Review 
does not lead to vacatur of all ownership limits, the Commission 
cannot expand a rule without first justifying it in its current 
form. The Commission responds that the television JSA rule is 
not subject to § 202(h), which in its view is limited to a review 
of where ownership levels are set (i.e., how many stations can be 
commonly owned) and does not extend to decisions about 
attribution (i.e., how much influence or control over a station 
creates the equivalent of ownership). 
50 
 
 At the outset, we must decide whether this dispute is 
properly before us. The Commission argues that Deregulatory 
Petitioners waived this challenge per 47 U.S.C. § 405(a). Under 
that provision, “a party seeking judicial review of an FCC 
‘order, decision, report, or action’ must file a petition for 
reconsideration if it ‘(1) was not a party to the proceedings 
resulting in such order, decision, report, or action, or (2) relies 
on questions of fact or law upon which the Commission . . . has 
been afforded no opportunity to pass.’” Prometheus II, 652 F.3d 
at 454 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 405(a)). The Commission says that 
Deregulatory Petitioners fail the second prong of this test 
because they did not present the argument to the Commission, 
either initially or in a petition for reconsideration, before 
requesting judicial review.  
 We conclude that the challenge is not waived. The text of 
§ 405(a) “does not refer to the necessity of a party raising an 
argument before the Commission—as does the typical 
exhaustion statute—but [instead] only [requires] that the 
Commission have an ‘opportunity to pass’ on a question of fact 
or law raised in the petition.” Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P. v. 
FCC, 144 F.3d 75, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). 
Thus, where a dissent by a Commissioner raises “the very 
argument” that the parties address to us, there is ordinarily no 
bar to judicial review because it would be “ignoring the realities 
of administrative decision-making to say that the [Commission] 
majority had no opportunity” to pass on the issue. Office of 
Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 465 F.2d 
519, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Prometheus II, without taking 
issue with the premise that a Commissioner’s dissent can fairly 
present an issue, we imposed some limitations. There two 
Commissioners raised a particular issue that the parties did not, 
but neither Commissioner devoted more than two sentences to it. 
Under those circumstances, we concluded that § 405(a) barred 
us from deciding that issue. Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 454–55. 
51 
 
We distinguished Office of Communication of United Church of 
Christ because, unlike in that case, it was “far from clear 
whether the full Commission considered” the dissents. Id. at 
455.  
 Our situation is different. Commissioner Pai issued a 
lengthy dissent that presented, in great detail, the argument that 
the television JSA rule violates § 202(h). As discussed, he said 
that the “merits of our attribution rules can’t be separated from 
the merits of our local television ownership rules” and that the 
Commission was “obliged to take into consideration” arguments 
against the ownership caps before expanding attribution. Pai 
Dissent at 4596. He ended with a call for “our nation’s 
judiciary” to step in, which clearly signals that his rationale 
could provide the basis for a legal challenge. Id. at 4602. This 
sets us apart from the insufficient notice that the dissents 
provided in Prometheus II.  
 Moreover, the Commission demonstrated an awareness 
of a potential § 202(h) challenge. Indeed, it expressly contrasted 
its ownership limits, which it conceded were subject to § 202(h), 
with its attribution decisions. It said that for attribution the “sole 
focus” is whether agreements “give the brokering station” a 
sufficient amount of “influence and control,” and it disavowed 
the need to make the type of public interest inquiry that is 
required under § 202(h). 2014 FNPRM & Order ¶ 349. As a 
result of this and Commissioner Pai’s dissent, the Commission 
had notice of the argument, and nothing in § 405(a) bars us from 
deciding it.  
 Turning to the merits, we agree with Deregulatory 
Petitioners that the Commission violated § 202(h) by expanding 
the reach of the ownership rules without first justifying their 
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preexisting scope through a Quadrennial Review.15 In 
Prometheus I we made clear that § 202(h) requires that  “no 
matter what the Commission decides to do to any particular 
rule—retain, repeal, or modify (whether to make more or less 
stringent)—it must do so in the public interest and support its 
decision with a reasoned analysis.” Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 
395. Attribution of television JSAs modifies the Commission’s 
ownership rules by making them more stringent. And, unless the 
Commission determines that the preexisting ownership rules are 
sound, it cannot logically demonstrate that an expansion is in the 
public interest. Put differently, we cannot decide whether the 
Commission’s rationale—the need to avoid circumvention of 
ownership rules—makes sense without knowing whether those 
rules are in the public interest. If they are not, then the public 
interest might not be served by closing loopholes to rules that 
should no longer exist.  
 To see how this problem plays out, we return to our 
example from above, where an entity owns a duopoly (two 
television stations with overlapping contours in a market) that is 
permitted under the local television ownership rule. That entity 
also has a JSA over the 15-percent threshold with a third 
overlapping station in the same market. Prior to the 2014 
FNPRM & Order, this arrangement would be compliant because 
the JSA would not have been attributable. As a result of the 
2014 FNPRM & Order, however, the entity would need to sell 
one of the two stations it outright owns or unwind its JSA with 
the third station because otherwise it would be considered to 
own three stations in violation of the limit. It would need to do 
                                              
15 Deregulatory Petitioners also argue that the JSA rule is 
arbitrary and capricious. Because we conclude that it violates 
§ 202(h), we do not need to reach this or any other challenge to 
the rule.  
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so even though the FCC has not determined since the 2006 
Quadrennial Review that it is even in the public interest to limit 
the number of stations that can be under common control in the 
same market.  
 The Commission’s response—that its attribution 
decisions are separate from its ownership rules and are not 
subject to § 202(h)—does not persuade us. First, it is foreclosed 
by Prometheus I. There we called the radio JSA rule a 
“modification to the local radio ownership rule” and only upheld 
it after determining that it complied with § 202(h). Id. at 429–
30. Second, even if we were not bound by Prometheus I, the 
Commission’s proposed distinction is artificial. Attribution rules 
do not exist separately from the ownership rules to which they 
relate. If there were no ownership caps, there would be no need 
to have attribution rules. The purpose of the latter is to delimit 
the scope of the former. Because attribution is so entwined with 
ownership caps, it would make little sense to say that one is 
subject to § 202(h) but the other is not.16   
                                              
16 It is true that there is at least one other instance following the 
adoption of § 202(h) where the Commission has altered its 
attribution rules without finishing a full review cycle. 
Specifically, the 1999 attribution of television LMAs came 
shortly before the completion of the 1998 § 202(h) review. 
However, the history of that attribution decision sets it apart 
from the current one. When Congress enacted § 202(h), the 
Commission had already undertaken efforts to revise the local 
television ownership rule. The Commission therefore decided to 
forge ahead with the changes outside (and ahead) of its § 202(h) 
proceedings. On the same day it enacted the television LMA 
attribution rule, it issued a separate order modifying the local 
television ownership rule and concluding that the rule, as 
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 In light of this, we hold that the Commission cannot 
expand its attribution policies for an ownership rule to which 
§ 202(h) applies unless it has, within the previous four years, 
fulfilled its obligation to review that rule and determine whether 
it is in the public interest.17 Here the Commission put the cart 
                                                                                                     
amended, served the public interest. See Review of the 
Commission’s Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, 
Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 12903, ¶ 59 (Aug. 5, 1999). It 
later determined that this procedure, though conducted outside 
of the formal § 202(h) context, satisfied the provision’s 
requirements. See 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of 
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules, Biennial Review 
Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 11058, ¶ 3 (May 26, 2000). As a result, the 
Commission only attributed television LMAs after making what 
it considered to be a § 202(h)-compliant finding that regulating 
television ownership continued to be in the public interest. We 
also note that no party sought judicial review of the 1999 
attribution decision on the theory that it violated § 202(h), so no 
court had the opportunity to determine whether the procedure 
was valid.  
 
17 We note the possibility that a reviewing court may ultimately 
disagree with the Commission’s public interest determination on 
an ownership rule. This is not necessarily fatal to the ability to 
enact an attribution rule. For instance, in Prometheus I we 
concluded that the Commission had failed to justify the specific 
numerical limits on how many radio stations a company could 
control under the local radio ownership rule. Prometheus I, 373 
F.3d at 432–34. We nonetheless permitted the Commission to 
enact the radio JSA rule. The difference is that it had 
determined—and we had agreed—that limiting common 
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before the horse. It adopted the JSA rule even though its 
Quadrennial Review cycle was severely backlogged. Because 
the rule’s enactment was procedurally invalid, we vacate it and 
remand the matter to the Commission. Cf. Prometheus II, 652 
F.3d at 453 (vacating and remanding rule that did not comply 
with notice-and-comment requirements).  
 On remand, if the Commission is able to justify (by 
finding they are in the public interest) the existing ownership 
rules to which television JSA attribution applies—or, in the 
alternative, if it replaces the current rules with new ones it 
determines to be in the public interest—nothing in our opinion 
would prevent it from readopting the JSA rule at that time. The 
rule, if readopted, might be challenged on grounds that extend 
beyond what we decide today, and we offer no opinion on the 
merits of any such attacks. We merely note that our decision to 
vacate is unrelated to the question of whether television JSAs 
should be attributable interests and rests instead on the 
Commission’s failure to comply with § 202(h).18 
                                                                                                     
ownership of radio stations was in the public interest. Id. at 431–
32. Its only failure was its lack of sufficient explanation for the 
precise limit on common ownership. Here, by contrast, we are 
not dealing with a Quadrennial Review that is merely flawed, 
but rather with one that has never been completed. Before 
defining ownership more restrictively, as it does when it enacts 
an attribution rule, the Commission must at a bare minimum 
show that it is even in the public interest to regulate ownership 
in the first instance.   
 
18 JSAs and LMAs are part of a broader universe of sharing 
agreements that the Commission has called “shared service 




 In sum, we conclude that the Commission has delayed 
too long on the eligible entity definition, and we remand and 
order mediation; we decline to vacate the whole universe of 
broadcast ownership rules that are subject to § 202(h), but we 
remind the Commission of its obligation to complete its 
                                                                                                     
Commission sought comment on whether to require disclosure 
of other types of SSAs. See 2014 FNPRM & Order ¶ 320. 
Petitioners have attacked this decision from both sides.  
 
 Citizen Petitioners say that the Commission acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously by not attributing all remaining SSAs 
at the same time it attributed television JSAs. The Commission 
responds that it needs to study the broader SSA universe more 
closely before making an attribution decision. In light of this, 
Citizen Petitioners’ claim fails. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (“[T]he reform may take 
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem 
which seems most acute to the legislative mind.”); Nat’l Ass’n of 
Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(“[A]gencies, while entitled to less deference than Congress, 
nonetheless need not deal in one fell swoop with the entire 
breadth of a novel development . . . .”). 
 
 Deregulatory Petitioners, by contrast, argue that the 
decision to single out JSAs was arbitrary and capricious because 
the Commission conceded that it did not have enough 
information to attribute the whole SSA universe. We need not 
decide this, as we are vacating the JSA rule on another basis. 
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Quadrennial Review responsibilities; and we vacate the 
television JSA rule and remand the matter to the Commission. 
 This is our third go-round with the Commission’s 
broadcast ownership rules and diversity initiatives. Rarely does a 
trilogy benefit from a sequel. To that end, we are hopeful that 
our decision here brings this saga to its conclusion. However, 
we are also mindful of the likelihood of further litigation. As a 
result, this panel retains jurisdiction over the remanded issues. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
 
I join in my colleagues’ comprehensive analysis and 
disposition of the eligible entity definition and the television 
joint sales agreement rule.  With regard to the Commission’s 
inaction on the broadcast ownership rules, however, I 
respectfully dissent.  I would neither dismiss the petitions nor 
would I vacate the broadcast ownership rules.  But I would 
compel the Commission to take final action.   
 
The Commission has declined to issue a final order 
that decides whether the five broadcast ownership rules 
continue to be “necessary in the public interest as the result of 
competition,” as required by Section 202(h) of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.  By opting to “merge” the 
2010 Quadrennial Review into the 2014 Quadrennial Review 
rather than complete it, the Commission has evaded its 
congressional mandate under Section 202(h) and this Court’s 
directives in Prometheus II.  The Quadrennial Review process 
has foundered and, like a sailboat, needs to right itself and get 
back on course. 
 
 The Commission has a duty to complete its now long-
overdue 2010 Quadrennial Review, both under Section 
202(h) and under our remand order in Prometheus II.  Section 
706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§706(1), permits us to “compel agency action unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed” in circumstances where 
(as here) the agency is compelled to take a specific action.  
See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 62-63 
(2004).  This Court also has authority to issue a writ of 
mandamus to prevent the frustration of its own previously-
2 
 
issued orders.  See In re: Chambers Dev. Co., Inc., 148 F.3d 
214, 224 (3d Cir. 1998); see also In re Core Commc’ns, 531 
F.3d 849, 856 (D.C. Cir. 2008).   
 
 It has been more than eight years since the public and 
the industry have had the benefit of a current assessment of 
the broadcast ownership rules.  As my colleagues aptly 
observe, the Commission’s delay has had significant 
consequences.  While the industry changes and evolves and 
new technologies emerge, broadcasters are required to adhere 
to a set of ownership rules, at least one of which is now four 
decades old, without the benefit of a fresh assessment of 
whether “such rules are necessary in the public interest as the 
result of competition.”  Perhaps they are and perhaps they are 
not; that decision is not for this Court to make in the first 
instance.  But the Commission must make some decision, 
either to retain, repeal, or modify those rules.   
 
 As my colleagues recognize, the Deregulatory 
Petitioners chose to pursue a bold form of relief, asking this 
Court to strike down all of the broadcast ownership rules 
entirely.  But an advocate’s arguable overreach is not a basis 
for declining to act.  Given the egregious delay in the face of 
a congressional directive and a mandate from this Court, a 
disagreement with the Petitioners about the proper form of 
relief should not bar us from taking action. 
 
The Commission Chair has stated that he intends to 
circulate a draft final order by the end of June.  But a draft 
proposal by one Commissioner is no guarantee that a final 
order is forthcoming.  At oral argument, the Commission 
would not agree to any firm deadline for action, noting, “It’s a 
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multimember body.  It’s hard to bind them.”  There should be 
a firm timeline for action. 
 
In In re Core Communications, the Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit considered a similar case of egregious 
Commission delay under a different provision of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.  The Court determined that 
the unreasonably delayed agency action under APA § 706(1) 
and the agency’s violation of the Court’s prior mandates 
warranted judicial intervention.  It therefore granted a writ of 
mandamus and directed the Commission to respond – in the 
form of a final, appealable decision – within a strict timeline 
for action.  See 531 F.3d at 862.   
 
I would follow that approach here.  Under APA 
§706(1) and in furtherance of our mandate in Prometheus II, I 
would issue a writ of mandamus and remand this matter to the 
Commission with the instruction that it must adopt and issue 
a final decision completing the 2010 Quadrennial Review of 
the broadcast ownership rules within six months.  I would 
direct that this Court retain jurisdiction to ensure compliance 
with this deadline. 
